Some of these differences were bound up in the peculiar conditions of Russian history and culture. The mammoth size and ethnological diversity of the Russian Empire and the near Pharaoh-like character of the Tsar's position as ruler were unique.
Moreover, coming over a hundred years after the previous two revolutions and after the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the Russian experience was shaped by the subsequent rise of a militant Labor movement and Socialism as a radical political movement. The American and French revolutions were pre-industrial and consequently reflected the ideas of National identity and popular sovereignty bequeathed by enlightenment theories, whereas the Russian Revolution was heavily influenced by ideas of internationalism and class division.
Nevertheless there are number of points of commonality. First, the Russian Revolutionaries, just as their American and French counterparts, saw themselves as part of a great historical movement for the abolition of Monarchical absolutism and aristocratic privilege and towards popular rule.
They considered themselves to be the inheritors and forwarders of a revolutionary legacy. As with the previous revolutions it's roots extended farther back than is widely appreciated.
To begin with, the Russian revolution wasn't a single insurrection but two. The revolution was prefigured by the revolution. The latter was itself preceded by an extended period of radical ferment.
The revolution of , like the American and French, was the culmination of an unfolding historical and political process. Again like the earlier revolutions, the revolution of was essentially reformist in nature, drawing to a close when the Tsar, against his will and in bad faith, appeared to capitulate to demands for greater civil and political liberties, a limited Constitutional Monarchy and an elected national assembly known as the Duma by issuing the October Manifesto.
This ploy proved successful in that it split supporters of the revolution between those who saw the Manifesto as victory and those who saw through it. Having divided the opposition, the Tsarist regime moved swiftly to suppress the remaining revolutionaries and to reestablish its autocracy. By the Tsar had re-written election laws to ensure that the Duma would be dominated by the landed gentry and urban business interests, effectively subordinate to his wishes.
Nevertheless, the ten years leading up to the Revolution of saw most of the elements that had participated in the Revolution, including the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks , entering the Duma in order to remain politically relevant. This despite the fact that the duma was at best reformist in character and at worst a hollow shell. At the outbreak of the February Revolution in which toppled the Tsarist regime it wasn't the radical elements that forced the Tsar's abdication and established the Provisional Government.
Moreover, at that time both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks supported the establishment of a liberal, democratic government in Russia rather than an immediate socialist revolution. The Bolshevik position did not change until Lenin returned to Russia and issued his April Theses a little over a month following the revolution. Six tumultuous months would pass before the Bolsheviks seized power in October of Certain points emerge from a comparison of these three revolutions.
First, none of them began as avowedly revolutionary struggles. All began as reformist movements and only moved to a radical stage under the impact of events. While radicals participated, it was not they but the reformers who led these struggles through their early stages.
Second, each went through an extended period of organizing and experimentation which produced alternate structures of administration to those of the existing regime. In no case did the actual overthrow of the status quo precede this process. Third, in keeping with the first and second, the initial stages of these revolutions were characterized by a unity of purpose among all forces opposing the status quo. They did not divide themselves in internecine combats between the reformist and radical elements.
Despite the very real differences between various factions, they maintained a solid front until the overthrow of the existing regime was completed. What this suggests is that, as a matter of historical fact, the relationship between the reformist and the radical elements, at least in the initial stages of the revolutionary process, is synergistic rather than antagonistic.
For some idea that reform is part and parcel of the revolutionary process is anathema. It is even argued that reform is the "main enemy" and that it must be defeated and repudiated before the status quo can be ousted. Putting aside the fact that historic experience contradicts this view, there remains an obvious objection.
The only way that reforms can block the revolutionary process is if they are successful at mending the existing society, thus rendering revolution unnecessary. We see, in this volume, how the colonial attempt to "civilize" Africa set in motion a dialectical process that refashioned the everyday lives of all those drawn into its purview, creating hybrid cultural forms and potent global forces which persist in the postcolonial age.
This fascinating study shows how the initiatives of the colonial missions collided with local traditions, giving rise to new cultural practices, new patterns of production and consumption, new senses of style and beauty, and new forms of class distinction and ethnicity.
As noted by reviewers of the first volume, the Comaroffs have succeeded in providing a model for the study of colonial encounters. By insisting on its dialectical nature, they demonstrate that colonialism can no longer be seen as a one-sided relationship between the conquering and the conquered. It is, rather, a complex system of reciprocal determinations, one whose legacy is very much with us today. Back to top. Table of Contents. List of Illustrations Preface Chronology 1.
Introduction 2. Or perhaps knowing a person is irreducible to knowing about that person see, e. For example, how could one know somebody by acquaintance without at the same time knowing that this person exists which is a piece of propositional knowledge? Wellington ; Lamont 7—8. This reasoning will not convince those who deny the existence of propositions see, e. However, among those who accept propositions, many have taken the contrast that Hordern and others draw between revelation of propositions and divine self-revelation to be misconceived.
God could not reveal himself without simultaneously revealing making knowable some propositions about himself. Propositions must figure in the content a of both propositional and manifestational revelations. In manifestational revelations, however, they do not figure as means k.
Another important difference between propositional and manifestational revelation concerns the need for interpretation.
Such media of revelation contain a wealth of information, and it is up to the recipient to decide which aspects of the manifestation to focus on. In propositional revelation, on the other hand, the audience is confronted with entities such as words and sentences that are specially designed to express a determinate message.
Hence, even though interpretation is involved in the reception of both propositional and manifestational revelation, in the case of propositional revelation, less of it is needed Wolterstorff Arguably, it follows from this that if God wants to convey a fairly determinate cognitive content, he will have good reason to use some form of propositional revelation perhaps in addition to manifestational revelation Mansini Why, then, are some theologians critical of propositional revelation?
While here are different kinds of critique Helm ; Gunton 7—13 , the main objection has to do with how the notion of propositional revelation is thought to affect biblical interpretation. However, it is possible that parts of the Bible record propositional revelations that were originally given to prophets, apostles and others.
Moreover, some original divine communications of this kind might not even be recorded in the Bible but instead preserved and interpreted through an oral tradition, as traditional Catholic and Orthodox perspectives hold however, see Ratzinger Attacking premise 2 , the defenders of divine authorship point out that propositions can be expressed by metaphorical and other non-literal forms of language.
A propositional construal of biblical revelation does not mean that a narrowly literalistic approach to the Bible is necessary Lamont Ch. Attacking premise 3 , they furthermore argue that divine authorship is compatible with the text being shaped by the cultural and personal perspectives of the human authors. For criticism, see Wisse ; Levine If this is what God has done, then biblical interpretation will require that we distinguish between the intentions and message of the human authors, and the intention and message of the divine, appropriating discourse.
The former may contain erroneous or morally problematic views, which are not asserted by the divine author. Another way of explaining how a medium of divine propositional revelation could possibly contain errors, is by distinguishing between the statements that are expressed through the medium the biblical text , and the sometimes problematic cultural presuppositions in terms of which they are expressed Swinburne Ch. Since it is probably impossible to make statements that do not depend on the presuppositions of any particular culture, and since all cultures embody some false beliefs and problematic conceptions, it is to be expected, argues Swinburne, that a divine revelation will be expressed by means of presuppositions some of which are false for criticism, see Stump — According to a common understanding, inspiration is a special divine influence on the writers of the biblical books.
Not all theologians accept this view of biblical inspiration, however, see, e. The divine influence could conceivably take different forms Davies 41—44; Burtchaell Some involve a detailed divine guidance on the level of statements or propositions, while other versions portray inspiration as limited to the main ideas of the text.
Presumably, if God is to control the outcome of such a process, he must influence social groups over extended periods of time. What is the relationship between divine inspiration and the idea of divine authorship of the Bible? According to Wolterstorff, these are quite distinct phenomena. Of course, God must do something in order for authorization to happen, for example influencing the process of canonization.
That said,. Wolterstorff For the justification of belief in inspiration, see Crisp According to traditional Christian perspectives, on the other hand, divine inspiration is an essential condition for divine authorship see, e. Traditional views also presume that inspiration entails inerrancy—that is, freedom from errors in all respects, not just with respect to essential contents Burtchaell 1—2; for a critique of inerrancy, see Abraham Ch.
Besides challenges from contemporary biblical criticism, such views also face the challenge to explain how inspiration is compatible with the freedom of the human authors which few would want to deny and their status as genuine authors rather than mere puppets. Perhaps the best shot at success belongs to those who defend a traditional view from the standpoint of a Thomistic understanding of divine causality. From such a perspective, God is the principal cause and the human authors of the Bible are secondary or instrumental causes see Feingold —; for criticism, see Rahner Instrumental causes are real causes, so the human authors are real authors.
Moreover, God presumably does not choose instrumental causes arbitrarily, but with an eye to their aptness for the effects he has in mind i. The diversity found in the Bible could hence be precisely what God aimed at in choosing people with different temperaments, skills, and experiences as his instruments. Still, since the effect of an instrumental cause transcends the power of that cause taken alone and manifests the power of the principal cause, it is appropriate to say that God is the principal author of the Bible.
Moreover, according to the Thomistic view, God acts through instrumental causes in a way that respects their nature, and this is true also when God uses human free will as an instrument.
A potential weakness of this account is that it presumes a controversial and possibly incoherent view about the compatibility of human freedom and divine causality.
The distinction between propositional and manifestational revelation is very general, and a more fine-grained classification of conceivable means of revelation is desirable. Beyond this, the theologian Avery Dulles has suggested a typology useful for categorizing theories of manifestational revelation. Revelation as History. The Bible is seen as the record of these deeds, for example the Exodus or the resurrection of Jesus.
The biblical text itself, however, is not part of revelation. Some representatives of this approach hold that revelation must include a supernatural cognitive assistance illumination so that the historical events can be interpreted correctly Baillie Others deny that this is necessary Pannenberg Revelation as Inner Experience.
Others take the relevant experiences to be conceptually structured and more like perceptual experiences Alston ; Pike The pre-conceptual view encounters epistemological puzzles about how non-conceptual inner occurrences can justify beliefs about God, or how the experiences can be about God in the first place Proudfoot Revelation as Dialectical Presence.
It is unclear whether this model manages to present a coherent account of divine revelation for a sympathetic discussion, see McCormack 28— The intention behind the model, however, is to reconcile the claim that revelation provides real, objective knowledge of God with the claim that God radically transcends all human categories and all created media of revelation. Revelation as New Awareness. In essence, revelation is more about seeing the self and the world in a new light than about knowledge of God Dulles 98, 99, Such an account requires appeal to propositional revelation at some point, or at least to traditional natural theology Wahlberg Ch.
The existence of revelatory claims in different religions raises the question of epistemic justification: Could such claims be justified, and in that case, how? In the contemporary debate, there are both non-inferential and inferential evidentialist models of justification for revelatory claims. However, since the contemporary debates about justification draw inspiration from a long tradition of reflection within theology, it will be useful first to consider some historical background.
In historical Christian thought, the concepts of special revelation and faith go together. Faith is the believing response to the divine revelation Dulles 4. There has been a broad consensus that the act of faith requires grace in the sense of an internal, divine influence or assistance.
However, classical Christian thinkers also agree that the act of faith is reasonable, and that Christian belief is epistemically justified to an eminent degree Lamont Important church fathers such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Chrysostom and Augustine all held that there are good arguments from publicly accessible evidence for the veridicality of the Christian revelation—arguments that establish the claim that God has spoken beyond reasonable doubt.
Patristic arguments typically appeal to fulfilled prophecies, miracles,. Lamont 46, However, the major church fathers did not seem to view these apologetic arguments as necessary for proper faith, or as the epistemic basis for faith. Instead, the divine revelation itself—the word of God—is often portrayed as having the power to non-inferentially justify Christian beliefs.
As Clement of Alexandria writes,. He who has believed in the divine Scriptures, with a firm judgement, receives as an irrefutable demonstration the voice of God who gave us those Scriptures. So faith is no longer something that is confirmed by demonstration.
Stromate II , 2, 9, quoted in Lamont Augustine, likewise, emphasized that Christian belief is produced by God working internally in the believer through grace. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas affirms both the supernatural, grace-induced character of Christian belief and its rational warrant. Since Aquinas is a common reference point in contemporary discussions about faith and revelation, it will be helpful to consider his thought in a bit more detail.
Aquinas believes that the Christian revelatory claim can be justified, at least to a significant degree, by inferential arguments see, e. Sometimes he seems to suggest that arguments are necessary for rational assent to revelation Summa Theologiae II-II, q.
See also Niederbacher — Due to this tension, there are different interpretations of Aquinas. As we will see in the following sections, similar elements recur in contemporary theories. According to the Naturalist Interpretation , at least some persons assent to the articles of the Creed because, first, they accept a cluster of arguments from natural theology, second, they believe on the basis of human testimony and other evidence that miracles and other signs have occurred in biblical history and in the history of the church.
From these considerations they conclude that God has made a revelation in history, which is contained, in its essence, in the Creed. The Christian revelatory claim is justified on this inferential basis. The Voluntarist Interpretation , on the other hand, claims that a consideration of the evidence is insufficient to elicit firm assent to revelation.
Aquinas says:. We are moved to believe the words of God insofar as the reward of eternal life is promised to us if we have believed; and this moves the will to assent.
De Veritate , q. However, since the activity of the will—when it comes to belief in God—is part of a reliable belief-forming process put in place by grace, the beliefs that it produces are warranted. Aquinas, hence, was an epistemological reliabilist of sorts, according to this view Ross ; Stump The Supernatural Externalist Interpretation gives arguments from public evidence a role in preparing a person for the assent of faith. However, the actual assent is the product of a supernaturally infused cognitive habit.
Belief in the revelatory claim is hence a basic belief, and it is justified. Jenkins — Most contemporary Aquinas scholars now reject the Naturalist Interpretation, which cannot do justice to the textual evidence. Hence, even though Aquinas indeed presents a collection of credibility arguments, he seems to have held that belief in divine revelation can be—and usually is—justified in some other, non-inferential way.
Starting with Duns Scotus, the role of inferential arguments in the rational acceptance of revelation was gradually expanded and made more precise in mainstream Christian thought. The act of faith was reduced to the drawing of the necessary inference from this insight to the conclusion that Christian beliefs are true.
As we have seen, however, the church fathers and Thomas Aquinas held more complex views in which elements of both inferential and non-inferential justification are found, and where supernatural grace and the will play important epistemic roles. Below we will encounter again these elements in the accounts of contemporary philosophers and theologians.
A claim is non-inferentially justified when its positive epistemic status is a result of some form of direct cognition, as opposed to being achieved through a process of inference from evidence. Since intentional design by definition entails a designer, this means that our experiences of nature could give us immediate knowledge of the existence of a creator Ratzsch ; Wahlberg ; Plantinga Ch.
For related views, see Mullen and Evans The putative plausibility of this hypothesis depends on the phenomenological observation that the appearance of design in nature is something that forcefully strikes most people, even atheists. As Hume lets Cleanthes say:. Consider, anatomize the eye … and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of a sensation? Psychological research, moreover, indicates that teleological beliefs about nature come natural to humans.
A related consideration in favor of design-perception is that it could potentially explain why beliefs about design in nature are so widespread and often held so persistently, even though they have turned out to be hard to justify by argument Ratzsch — Adapted to the present context, the argument runs something like this: Since beliefs about intentional design in nature arise in a similar way as ordinary perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs, there is no reason to discriminate among these classes of beliefs with respect to their prima facie epistemic status.
Hence, if we regard perceptual and memory beliefs as prima facie justified without argument, we should regard design-beliefs in the same way. It could be objected that in order to have beliefs about design, a rather complex conceptual background is necessary. Design beliefs, therefore, cannot be understood as perceptual.
However, the necessity of a conceptual background for having a certain kind of perceptual beliefs does not necessarily entail that those beliefs are inferentially derived from the background McDowell ; Wahlberg — See also McGrath Ch. Is evolution a defeater for the idea of design-perception?
De Cruz and De Smedt Perhaps not. The hypothesis that God creates indirectly, through the evolutionary process, entails that God exerts a certain control over the outcomes of that process. This means that God has intended at least certain features of the outcome, and these features would hence count as divinely designed. Since divine design in this sense seems to be compatible with evolution, design-perception might be as well Wahlberg —; Kojonen Another objection proceeds from the claim that design-beliefs about nature are generated by mechanisms that are too unreliable to confer positive epistemic status.
The debate about this is ongoing Barrett 31; Visala Ch. In the realm of special revelation , there are also theories of direct, perceptual justification.
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