Some argue that humans have cumulative culture because only we have both teaching and imitation Galef, ; Hill, ; Dean et al. The development of a natural pedagogy to transmit this knowledge may thus have acted as the main force of cumulativeness Csibra and Gergely, ; Pradhan et al. Animal cultures, in contrast, are argued to be causally transparent and to not require instructions to be acquired Csibra and Gergely, Cognitively, intentional teaching and especially pedagogy appear demanding, in that multiple representations must be stored, manipulated, and compared simultaneously Gergely et al.
We therefore argue that higher levels of cumulative culture depend on representational abilities, to be examined in detail below. Importantly, while both mechanisms occur in humans, there is currently no good evidence for normative conformity in animals. In humans, normative conformity is demonstrated if individuals are less likely to choose the behavioral variant of the majority in private than social contexts Deutsch and Gerard, , a paradigm that to our knowledge has not yet been used with non-human primates.
An open question remains how important majority influences really are in the transmission of animal behavior, as most empirical studies have not quantified differences in social transmission rates as a function of the number of available models van Leeuwen and Haun, , and whether there really exists a disproportionate tendency to copy the majority in non-humans.
Another good indicator for normative conformity is the punishment of individuals who deviate from social norms Hill, , p.
Certain processes are shared by both informational and normative conformity van Schaik, , with informational conformity forming the basis for normative conformity. A graded integration of already present underlying mechanisms, such as informational normativity, fairness-related behaviors Brosnan, or punishment, may have thus led to normative conformity. Similar to what has been argued for cumulative culture, graded cognitive differences may explain the jump from informational to normative conformity.
The analysis of the representational dimension of culture requires a cognitive approach, which we will develop in the next sections. Psychological studies of humans have repeatedly documented how culture affects cognition Mesquita and Frijda, ; Greenfield, ; Kitayama et al. For instance, children initially prefer geocentric absolute strategies in spatial memory tasks but by age eight show culturally dependent strategies, which is also reflected in their spatial language Haun et al.
Additionally, the same study showed that great apes also prefer geocentric strategies, suggesting a shared evolutionary origin. However, despite such studies and despite considerable interest in the cognitive underpinnings of animal social behavior Call and Santos, , less work has been conducted to understand how cognition and culture intertwine when it comes to representing knowledge in non-humans. As a result, the human-animal gap remains wide, with animal cultures characterized by group-specific catalogs of behaviors and human cultures characterized by group-specific catalogs of norms and their practices.
Most animal studies have not attempted to address the extent to which mental representations affect cultural behavior. One way to address the cognitive processes underlying animal culture empirically is to present individuals belonging to different cultural groups with a problem that can be solved in different ways. If the problem is solved in line with pre-existing behavioral preferences, then this can be interpreted as a signal for differences in underlying mental representations.
This interpretation is particularly compelling when individuals do not seem to comprehend their environment in the same way, notably if one object such as a stick appears to be understood as a tool in one given community, but not in the other one. Possessing mental representations defines the ability to think Byrne, ; being able to access and modify these representations is a crucial feature to cope with everyday tasks.
However, species may differ in their capacity to do so. In a recent example, two groups of chimpanzees in Uganda, the Sonso community of Budongo Forest and the Kanyawara community of Kibale Forest, were exposed to an identical problem, honey trapped in a cavity of a large tree trunk Figure 1 , Gruber et al.
The two communities differ culturally, especially in terms of whether or not they use sticks as foraging tools Whiten et al.
Results showed that members of the two communities solved the problem with group-specific techniques consistent with their cultural knowledge, that is, stick use in Kanyawara and leaf-sponging in Sonso. Hence, the chimpanzees applied previously acquired tool use behavior to a novel foraging problem.
A particularly relevant point was that, although all Kanyawara chimpanzees knew how to manufacture leaf-sponges, no one chose this technique.
A member of the Kanyawara community extracting honey from the honey-trap apparatus during an experimental trial. Results showed that members of the two communities found different parts of the tool salient and used them accordingly.
At Sonso, individuals detached the leaves from the provisioned tool to manufacture a leaf-sponge, while at Kanyawara, the chimpanzees used the stick part of the tool to dip for honey Gruber et al.
Overall, these experiments suggest that chimpanzee behavior is determined by previous experience, or knowledge, which can differ between communities Gruber et al.
As a result, different communities may differ in how they recognize and use the affordances of an identical tool, suggesting that the way chimpanzees perceive their environment is biased by cultural knowledge Gruber et al. In a related study, rehabilitant orang-utans wild-born ex-captive individuals living in a sanctuary before reintroduction into the wild were exposed to the same honey-dipping task and to a raking task.
When individuals from two genetically distinct populations were tested they showed no difference in their performance in the raking task, suggesting that their potential understanding of sticks as tools was similar. In contrast, in the honey-dipping task, their performance varied in line with whether or not stick use was prevalent in their native populations, thus replicating the findings in chimpanzees Gruber et al.
Recently, the same patterns have been reported from two populations of capuchin monkeys Sapajus apella : monkeys that were naturally unfamiliar with manufacturing stick tools ignored and even discarded stick tools that were provisioned to gain access to an experimentally provided food source, while capuchins familiar with stick tool manufacture used sticks to obtain the same food Ottoni, personal communication.
Here, we define a mental representation as an internal cognitive construction of the mind that represents an aspect of the world. In doing so we follow Leslie , p. Such a basic capacity for representation can be called a capacity for primary representations.
Primary representation is thus defined in terms of its direct semantic relation with the world. In other words, a learned association between a tool and a reward can be represented as a unique mental representation e. This mental representation can be cultural because it can be wildly shared within the members of a given community, as the behavior it represents Sperber, Comparison of a representational system where individuals build independent representations A or can re-organize their knowledge into categories B in the case of tool use.
Full arrows: act of mentally representing. Square: content of mental representation, with or without embedded representations. Dashed arrows: connections within or between mental representations.
A Independent Representations : individual NT forms a learned association between distinct parts of the environment for example, a stick is associated with obtaining honey; a leaf-sponge is associated with obtaining water. B Re-organization of knowledge in categories : individual NT organizes individual representations hierarchically, potentially under larger object kinds. Great apes are cognitive animals Call and Tomasello, , in the sense that they can store their knowledge as primary representations, but the key question is whether they also have more complex representations, for instance, to represent and classify an object e.
In the following, we apply conceptual tools of developmental psychology to analyze the complexity of mental representations underlying great ape cultural behavior. Developmental psychology has long been interested in how infants come to understand their environment and the objects found therein Piaget, , including artifacts Margolis and Laurence, For instance, children may fail to see a solution to a tool-use problem if they are being offered a tool presented in a situation where it already has a well-defined purpose but where the situation requires a different use of this tool Defeyter and German, That children before age five do not show functional fixedness may be because they do not represent the intentionality of the maker, failing to understand that a tool has been intentionally manufactured by a designer to fulfill a specific function, a phenomenon known as adopting a design stance German and Defeyter, ; Kelemen and Carey, However, other interpretations of functional fixedness exist and do not connect it to the design stance.
Individuals may simply fail to see multiple uses of an object because previous experience has led them to form an association between an object and a given function.
This interpretation obviously makes functional fixedness a less cognitively complex mechanism, but other wild chimpanzee communities have overcome any fixedness on nest-building by having learned to incorporate sticks into their extractive tool repertoire.
This idea faces another problem when applied to the honey-trap experiment. It is unable to explain how the Sonso chimpanzees disregarded their only known function of leaf-sponges to absorb drinking water in favor of extracting honey from experimental cavities Gruber et al.
This suggests that leaf-sponges are not functionally fixed to the purpose of extracting water, although experiments presenting water and honey simultaneously are needed to support this hypothesis.
It is unlikely that the chimpanzees simply mistook the honey for water because it was very obvious during the experiments that subjects were aware that the resource was honey and not water, often visibly reacting to the stickiness of honey by rubbing their hands on the logs.
Moreover, no individuals at Kanyawara made a sponge to extract the honey, despite leaf-sponging being customary in this community, suggesting that the confusion hypothesis can be rejected.
Therefore, it is more plausible that the Sonso chimpanzees produced leaf-sponges to extract honey by some form of analogical reasoning Gillian et al. In summary, functional fixedness remains a possible explanation for the patterns observed in wild and captive chimpanzees, although it is difficult to decide whether this is based on simple or complex processes.
At the very least, individuals must have activated a mental representation e. For example, a chimpanzee may think of a leaf-sponge when finding a valuable resource in a cavity, without seeing an actual leaf-sponge — it can start looking for the appropriate leaf material to manufacture one as a consequence. Accessing knowledge, however, may be cognitively more complex and may require that the subject also knows that it has the knowledge of leaf-sponges, which requires the ability to generate representations of representations, i.
To facilitate progress regarding the relation between chimpanzee and human culture, we will next survey the different levels of representation that may or may not underlie ape cultural behavior. In its standard version, the subject is presented with a performance during which an agent a doll witnesses how an object is being placed in box A, but then is prevented from seeing how the object is moved to another box B.
As a result, the agent will have a false belief about where the object is hidden, i. Human infants generally understand such tasks from age four Doherty, , although more recent research has shown that precursor abilities required to solve the task emerge as early as age two Baillargeon et al.
Having a theory of mind requires some form of metarepresentational ability, the capacity to generate a representation of a representation. There is an ongoing debate about what exactly should qualify as a metarepresentation and different authors have proposed different terminologies. In the latter case, the agent engaging in metarepresentation must represent the fact that whatever is represented is itself a representation.
However, others have suggested that the subject does not necessarily have to be aware of the representational nature of the representation Leslie, TABLE 1. Connection between Metarepresentation Sense 1 and Sense 2, the context, individually centered or socially oriented, in which they occur; and the way they have been described in the literature.
In the following section, we review the different metarepresentational processes which appear central to the representation of tools, and more generally to culture, and order them in a way that could constitute an evolutionary pathway. Our goal is to identify the different types of representations and metarepresentations that could underlie and sustain animal cultures 1. Group differences in tool use behavior importantly contributed to the claim that chimpanzees have culture Whiten et al.
Therefore, understanding how primates mentally represent tools is key for any comparison between human and ape cultures. Not much theoretical work of this kind has been done in animals, despite the fact that great apes and capuchins are promising species to investigate these questions.
In all likelihood, modern human language is a fairly recent evolutionary invention that emerged well after humans had developed complex and variable tools Mithen, An important question is whether animals can represent tools at a conceptual level that is representing tools as objects with a given function to act on other objects and not solely at a perceptual level that is representing a tool based on its physical properties, Mandler, For example, can a chimpanzee categorize a leaf-sponge not only in terms of its perceived features wadge of folded leaves but also in terms of its function or purpose liquid-absorption?
One possible way to investigate this question is to study whether apes classify novel objects according to functional i. Work with cotton-top tamarins and rhesus monkeys has shown that individuals can group objects into meaningful categories, such as tools, foods, animals or landmarks, as well as recognize distinctive features of tools see Hauser and Santos, for a review. And for New Caledonian crows, it has already been shown that individuals can sort objects according to function, e.
Considering these results, it appears likely that tool-using primates such as chimpanzees, orang-utans or capuchins represent their tools as particular objects with a function to act on other parts of their environment, that is, at the conceptual level, but experimental work is needed to confirm this hypothesis.
The main benefit of re-representations is that they allow their bearer to reorganize acquired information, for example by allocating objects to categories, such as a leaf-wadge to a sponge tool.
Figure 2 illustrates this process in the context of tool use as a shift from a simple to a complex representational format. In the simple representational format, each tool is mentally represented as having one purpose e. In the complex representational format, simple representations also belong to more general categories, and the items belonging to one category can be selected to function on the items belonging to a different category [e.
One relevant observation here is that in the Gruber et al. One interpretation of this finding is that leaf-sponges are not exclusively and rigidly represented in connection with water, suggesting that the Sonso chimpanzees have employed re-representational abilities to find this solution. A second characteristic of re-representations is to allow an individual to maintain multiple mental representations simultaneously. Similarly, an individual may be able to simultaneously maintain separate mental models of two actions in order to compare them Perner, In the case of ape tool use, for example, re-representations may allow an individual to generate representations of competing techniques and compare them to solve a problem e.
A recent study from the Sonso chimpanzee community is in line with this interpretation. In November , a few individuals discovered a novel tool behavior, moss-sponging, to access water from a natural clay hole Hobaiter et al.
Importantly, all moss-using individuals were already skilled leaf-sponge makers, suggesting that they possessed mental representations of two techniques for one outcome, accessing clay water, or that they modified their existing mental representation of a leaf-sponge to add the possibility of moss instead of leaves, in contrast to others who did not develop the novel behavior. Whether or not individuals also compared both representations cannot be decided by this study.
Interestingly, the two techniques differ in efficiency moss-sponges appear to hold water better than leaf-sponges , suggesting that individuals should prefer moss-sponging, whenever moss is locally available. Primates are capable of assessing the physical properties of their tools, in particular with respect to size and weight of potential objects that can be used as tools to complete a task Matsuzawa, ; Fox et al. However, there is also evidence for cultural conservatism and individual habit formation in primates, which may prevent them from changing techniques Hrubesch et al.
More field experiments are needed to address how chimpanzees and other animals evaluate the efficiency of their techniques. If chimpanzees choose a solution that is more efficient than a habitual technique already present in their repertoire, a stronger association between the novel tool and the original substrate may be formed, leading ultimately to a change in the tool choice. However, this may require several trials to be achieved, which may not always be granted in natural settings.
The ability to compare mental representations, allowed by re-representational abilities, may allow switching to the novel technique directly after one individual trial or after witnessing others display this technique during social learning, making it a much faster, potentially more adaptive, process.
Comparison of a representational system where individuals can re-represent in parallel several actions in their mind A ; can re-represent the identity of the individual attached to the representation of the tool-using activity B ; and can fully metarepresent that other individuals may have different beliefs than themselves, applied to tool use C.
B Re-representation of techniques displayed by individuals : individual NT represents in parallel that she is obtaining honey by using a leaf-sponge, while individual NB is obtaining the same resource with a different tool, a stick.
A more complex form of re-representation is for an individual to understand that it is carrying out one technique while others may carry out the same or a different technique, albeit toward the same goal; or the individual may also represent itself performing two different techniques. Here, the re-representation is not only functional but also has a social dimension, by means of comparing the self with others or between others.
This mechanism may underlie the perception of intergroup differences, if such observations are possible. It would also be interesting to investigate how bonobos, who tend to be much more tolerant to the presence of strangers Furuichi, , would react to the sight of other communities displaying different behaviors from themselves. Equally relevant are imitation tasks, in which chimpanzees of high social status tend to be preferred as models for new techniques; however, this may also result from the fact that they are generally more attended to Horner et al.
In Hobaiter et al. A final characteristic of re-representations is that they allow representing tools, techniques, and the function of each component or sequence of actions Byrne and Russon, and their outcomes. They therefore allow representing a tool independently from the functional scheme in which it was originally defined. For instance, to build a composite tool, it is necessary to represent that both components can afford the same action, but also that their association results in higher efficiency.
The Acheulean hand-ax, observed from about 1. The near-absence of cumulative culture in apes, may therefore be due to their limited re-representational abilities, allowing some flexibility around behaviors that are already present in the repertoire for instance to invent a moss-sponge based on a known leaf-sponge but making qualitative jumps very unlikely.
Re-representations may also sustain other complex cognitive processes recently proposed to be involved in the cumulativeness of human culture such as mental time travel Fogarty et al. There is evidence for mental time travel coming from a range of other animals than humans, including great apes and corvids e. This suggests that some re-representational abilities are present in these species but that their extent is limited.
In sum, more work is needed to precisely understand the scope of re-representations and their use in animals. Here, cognition goes beyond simple re-representations, which could sustain all previous aspects of cultural knowledge, i.
How this effect connects to norms, however, remains to our knowledge to be investigated. This research may also benefit other areas of metarepresentation. Controlled learning experiments e. While this remains to be tested, it is therefore unlikely that a chimpanzee would be shocked when it sees another behaving differently from the group norm, which would require the individual to understand that others may have values that deviate from its own and, by extension, to have a profound understanding of its own culture.
Currently, we do not know whether this ability is present in apes and thus whether ape and human cultures differ in this important domain see Table 2. TABLE 2. Summary of the different stages of representations involved in the cultural process and their presence in humans and great apes, according to current knowledge. The notion of metarepresentation has become widely used in false-belief research, while other metarepresentational processes have been neglected Sperber, b.
Similarly, in the animal culture discussion, the latter have only played a role under the rubric of mindreading in comparing social learning processes that can lead to behavioral traditions, namely imitation and teaching Tomasello et al. In this article, we have argued that metarepresentational processes may be useful to explain a wider range of features of human and animal cultures, from representing objects as culture-specific, meaningful artifacts to understanding that another individual may or may not share a cultural belief.
For animals, it is conceivable that social learning acting on innovations driven by the environment is sufficient to generate the full range of behavioral traditions currently documented, but several recent studies question this hypothesis van de Waal et al. In humans, however, culture is a co-construction of minds, and this may require considerable flexibility in how knowledge is organized.
Therefore, culture without metarepresentational processes may never go beyond simple collections of behavioral traditions, acquired through social learning, usually confined within small social units e. In contrast, culture with simple metarepresentational processes re-representation may be present in great apes, and this may have served as the evolutionary origins of another type of culture: a pattern of ideas that have normative force.
Finally, culture with complex metarepresentation characterizes human culture, which is based on belief psychology, shared knowledge, values, and norms. In this article, we focussed largely on chimpanzee tool use to illustrate how to analyze the cognitive aspects underlying animal culture, particularly the role of mental representations.
We believe that our framework has a generic value and can be applied to all species with behavioral traditions, granted that they have the necessary brain structures for higher cognition, such as a neocortex mammals or equivalent structures in other species for instance, the dorsal ventricular ridge in birds, Dugas-Ford et al.
Although much of animal culture is material, there is evidence that a number of social behaviors also qualify as cultural e. In conclusion, to properly compare animal and human cultures it is necessary to identify the metarepresentational processes that underlie behavior.
We have identified two types of metarepresentational processes. How the two co-evolved will need consideration, notably as primate cognition evolved within stable social groups Byrne and Whiten, Great apes are the only available model to assess the evolutionary transition in behavior and cognitive abilities from early hominins to modern humans McPherron, It seems safe to assume that early hominins possessed material cultures at least as complex as described for modern great apes van Schaik et al.
Progress can be made by targeted research on great apes and other animals, concerning their relationships with artifacts. And then we heard that there were 17, yoga sites that claimed that yoga changed heart rate variability.
And I have to give a little bit of background here. Way back, already, in , Charles Darwin wrote a book about emotions in which he talks about how emotions are expressed in things like heartbreak and gut-wrenching experience. So you feel things in your body. And then it became obvious that if people are in a constant state of heartbreak and gut-wrench, they do everything to shut down those feelings in their body. One way of doing it is taking drugs and alcohol, and the other thing is that you can just shut down your emotional awareness of your body.
They may not register what goes on with them. And so what became very clear is that we needed to help people, for them to feel safe feeling the sensations in their bodies, to start having a relationship with the life of their organism, as I like to call it. And so a combination of events really led us into exploring yoga for that. And yoga turned out to be a very wonderful method for traumatized people to activate exactly the areas of consciousness, areas of the brain, the areas of your mind that you need in order to regain ownership over yourself.
And again, not only yoga; you could do maybe martial arts or qigong — but something that engages your body in a very mindful and purposeful way, with a lot of attention to breathing, in particular, resets some critical brain areas that get very disturbed by trauma. Not enough, of course. None of us ever does enough, but I try to start every day with a yoga practice.
Tippett: Now, did I read somewhere that you also found that your heart rate variability was not in sync and was not robust enough? And he had no memory of the accident in which he was disabled, and his body remembered it. He talks about body memory.
It sounds very sympathetic and very right. And the sense of the experiences, of feeling weight and feeling your substance …. Really feeling your body move, and the life inside of yourself, is critical.
And personally, for example, when people ask me, So, what sort of treatments have you explored? Rolfing is called after Ida Rolf. So your body sort of takes on a certain posture. And the idea of rolfing is that you really open up all these connections and make the body flexible again in a very deep way.
I had asthma as a kid. I was very sickly as a kid, because I was part of the group in the Netherlands — I mean, in the final year of the war in the Netherlands, during which I was born, about , kids died from starvation, and I was a very sickly kid.
And I think I carried it in my body for a long time. And rolfing helped me to overcome that, actually. So I now, my body became flexible and multipotential again.
And for my patients, I always recommend that they see somebody who helps them to really feel their body, experience their body, open up to their bodies. And I refer people always, to craniosacral work or Feldenkrais.
And I think those are all very important components about becoming a healthy person. We separated ourselves. We divided ourselves. I see this — I mean, yoga is everywhere now, right? And people are discovering all kinds of ways, as you say; there are all kinds of other ways to reunite ourselves.
But …. Western culture is astoundingly disembodied, and uniquely so. The way I like to say is that we basically come from a post-alcoholic culture. If you feel bad, just take a swig or take a pill. And the notion that you can do things to change the harmony inside of yourself is just not something that we teach in schools and in our culture, in our churches, in our religious practices. And of course, if you look at religions around the world, they always start with dancing, moving, singing ….
And then, the more respectable people become, the more stiff they become, somehow. For this second half, I caught up with him again to look at this moment through the unique lens of his training and perspective.
Tippett: Well, so some of the things that you notice through your work with trauma or — you know, the animal brain and the rational brain — you know, what you said to me those years ago is, the more upset you are, you shut down your rational part of your brain.
And our animal brains do not — it wreaks havoc with our animal brains, right? And that synchronicity between us and other people is much at the core of resistance through trauma, and makes us very vulnerable to become much more overwhelmed by all kind of stuff.
If a particular thing happens, you can help the mind and the brain to say, Yes, it happened, but it happened a long time ago. And right now we are living in a world that nothing belongs to the past. And it sort of keeps coming up and keeps coming up.
And our political situation is just terrifying. Tippett: I was thinking about this notion of memory and what you know through trauma, and how — the primacy of that. But I wonder, is it possible to help tend and steward the formation of those memories that will help make sense? Are there techniques for that that we could be turning to now, communally and individually? And I think this ongoing, low-level threat that we all live right now —.
Very few people move to shacks and turn out to be all by themselves. Tippett: I think something you just said about — oh gosh, my pandemic brain just clicked in. You just mentioned the people who have prior trauma. When an experience like this comes along, those things surface again, right? So then you have these multiple layers. I just feel like that is important for people to know. The issue of people needing to know that justice will be done or fairness will be happening is terribly important for all of us, to survive in the networks that we live in.
And I think many of us have also experienced that in our personal friendship network, where somehow I feel more warmth towards my friends than I was aware of before. We all say negative things about Zooming and stuff, but you know, my family was very deeply affected by the pandemic in , It was devastating. And I think about them all the time. And I think about how much worse it must have been for people back there — and I know, because my parents were very, very hurt people, as a consequence — and how great it is that I speak to my friends in Australia once a week, and I speak to my friends in San Francisco every other week.
You know, one thing I said in the script for the show we did before is, I — this was at the top of the show. I wonder, are there nuances of things you already knew about human beings and our bodies and our minds that, both being a — [ laughs ] an involuntary participant in this pandemic world, but also observing it as you have, in working with patients, are there ways in which your understanding of things and the work you do has been nuanced and illuminated by this experience?
Let me tell you about an experience I had recently. And …. In my last podcast with you, I mentioned how I was this very sickly child — actually, I just listened to it again — and how I had no memory of the imprint of that. Fred : Great. What do we do with them now? Shaggy : Let's cut out their kidneys and sell them to the black market and leave them in a seedy motel bathtub full of ice. Jay : Hey, I'll make you a deal - this guy. Jay : will suck your dick off if you let us go.
Jay : How about this deal- he'll suck my dick while you watch and jerk off. Jay : [ to Silent Bob ] It's either this or jail. And you know what they do to you in jail. Alright, and after it's all over, you say "Ooh, what a lovely tea party". Holden : Nothing.
The Internet has given everybody in America a voice. For some reason, everybody decides to use that voice to bitch about movies. Chaka's Production Assistant : Here's your coffee sir. Chaka's Production Assistant : I didn't spit in it sir. Chaka's Production Assistant : There's no boogers in it sir. Chaka : You went to film school didn't you? Must piss you off to see a black man runnin' a big old production like this, huh?
Went to film school. Does your daddy know you give a nigga his coffee? Must kill him, doesn't it! Chaka : Then taste it. Taste the booger flavor. I know it's in there! Chaka : Duck, pie fucker! Damn, these white boys can't fight. Hitchhiker : [ explaining why he gives head for rides ] Have you seen the price of bus tickets lately. There's no way I'm gonna cough up bucks just to get to Chicago.
Jay : Fuck that, I don't wanna cough up some dude's sperm. Hitchhiker : Don't be so suburban. It's the new millennium. Gay, straight There are no more lines. This store sure does suck ass, doesn't it?
Steve-Dave Pulasti : Holy Shit. Un-ban us. This guy'll suck your dick. Chrissy : Holy Fuck! The little stoner was right! Holden : This is a site populated by militant movie buffs: sad, pathetic little bastards living in their parents' basement downloading scripts and what they think is inside information about movies and actors they claim to despise yet can't stop discussing. Jay : [ to Silent Bob after being hit below the belt by Cocknocker ] Whoaaa Hemp Knight.
Whillenholly : [ to Banky ] Wow, there's a lot of love in the room. Banky : Regardless of what you may have heard, I do not kiss guys. Whillenholly : Okay, play it cool, hot shot. Holden : Why in God's name would I wanna keep writing about characters whose central preoccupation are weed and dick and fart jokes?
I mean, ya gotta grow man. Don't you ever want anything more for yourself? I know this poor hapless son of a bitch does. I look into his sorry doe eyes and I just, I see a man crying out. He's crying out, "When Lord?
When the fuck can your servant ditch this foul-mouthed little chucklehead to whom I am a constant victim of his folly, so much so that it prevents him from ever getting to kiss a girl!
When, Lord when? Hooper : You should be. They took your intellectual property and turned it into one minute long gay joke. Chaka's Production Assistant : [ after asked to get a new clean latte ] Here's your coffee sir, booger-free.
Chaka Luther King : [ slaps it out his hands ] Get that shit the fuck out of here. Jay : [ the monkey has been put into a car ] Man, who the fuck steals monkeys? Silent Bob : [ Points to Jay and himself ]. Jay : Justice, that's a nice name Jay : Jay and Justice sitting in a tree, f-u-c-k-i-n-g Jay : Holy fuck, is that monkey waving at us?
Oh, shit, It understood us! Maybe it's some kind of supermonkey. What if there's more supermonkeys up at that lab? Jay : What if they're creating an army of them? Holy shit. It must be a conspiracy like in the X-Files This little monkey could be the fuckin' damn dirty ape responsible for the fall of the human race. In this world gone mad, we won't spank the monkey- the monkey will spank us.
And after the fall of man, these monkey fucks'll start wearing our clothes and rebuilding the world in their image. Damn yous! Goddamn yous all to hell! Jay : Miramax? Brodie : Yeah, but then they made "She's All That" and it went downhill from there. Jay : [ after tossing Brent out of the van ] Now who's stupid, you dirty sheep fucker? Whillenholly : We don't want to rub the C. Whillenholly : Remember, folks T is not recommended.
Justice : They didn't really steal the monkey. It was just a diversion so we could steal these. Justice : And they're not the leaders of the C. The C. T is not real. Whillenholly : No the clit is real. Its the female orgasm that's the myth. Whillenholly : Sorry, Justice. We've gotta go. Whillenholly : Hey, stop stealing monkeys. Chaka : Do you think "Fat Albert" had an inker?
Ben Affleck : Are we gonna have a problem Whillenholly : And might I add, that is one fine looking boy you are raising. Jay : Hell yeah, that's because he's from my sperm. Whillenholly : Why are you shooting at me? I'm just a Federal Wildlife Marshall. Chrissy : Two reasons. One: we're walking, talking, bad girl cliches. Missy : And two: because you're a man. Whillenholly : Only on the outside. Oh Yeah! You chug that ass cock, baby.
You need two hands. Oh, you like that, MULE. Mules are Have you seen them roaming around? Jules Asner : No, Steve. But I did see Casey Affleck buying a soda from a concession stand. Chrissy : Kaboom, you little stoner fucks! Fred : Now we can finally solve the mystery of the hitchhiking ghouls. Pull of their masks and let's see who they really are! Daphne : And I don't think that they're hitchhiking girls either. I wish they were hitchhiking girls- sexy hitchhiking girls.
Fred : Let's kick 'em out! We've got a mystery to solve! Shaggy : The only mystery here is why we take our cues from a dick in a neckerchief! Fred : Keep it up, beatnik, I'll feed ya to the fuckin' dog! Jay : YO! Youse guys need to turn those frowns upside down, and I got just the thing for that Gus Van Sant : [ counting his money ] I'm busy.
Ben Affleck : You're a true artist, Gus. Jay : So what can a smooth pimp daddy like myself do to help the animals? Justice : Oh Jay : The fuck you talkin' about? Sure, I do. I'd do anything for you. Jay : I mean youse guys, I'd do anything for youse guys, 'cause for the lift and shit. Justice : Okay. Well, um, let me just talk to the other girls and get back to you. Jay : Yeah, you do that. I'll be right here waitin'.
Jay looks at Silent Bob and smirks, but Bob mockingly imitates Jay's move. Jay slaps his face ]. Jay : This place licks balls compared to the Quick Stop. Speakin' of lickin' balls, man, how 'bout that Justice chick?
She is TOO fine! And she smells SO fuckin' pretty. She has a nice voice, too. And that body? Fuckin' smokin'! You know, she didn't tell me to fuck off once when I was talkin' to her, or pull out the fuckin' pepper spray or anything.
You know, Lunchbox Jay : I hope one rips the other one's shirt off and we see some fuckin titties floppin around, yeah! Willenholly : Put the monkey down, and your hands up. Let's go, misters. Do you want to get shot? I didn't think so. Jay : Look, man.
She doesn't want to go back to the lab. And for the record, I ain't gay. Willenholly : And for the record, while we're one the subject, I knew that wasn't a real little boy. Jay : And for one more record, he does love the cock.
Brent : What's your damage, little boy? You've got a sick and twisted world perspective. Reg Hartner : And we do want to say to the people at home, the clit is not something to be played with. Jay : Hey. Get the fuck off her. That's my ex-girlfriend's monkey. Whillenholly : I don't get out to the movies that much, but "Bluntman and Chronic" was blunt-tastic. Whillenholly : Plaschke, this is Willenholly. I need you to get me on the national news, pronto.
Because we may very well be dealing with the two most dangerous men on the planet. Sheriff : The hell with this. Let's go back to the station house, and cornhole us a drunk. I told you that restraining order was a good idea.
Banky : Well, you're rich, you're in love. And you've both got your own monkey. What more could two guys from New Jersey want? Jay : Well, to have all these fucks stop talking shit about us on the Internet. Banky : What've I been telling you? There's nothing you can do about it. Unless you show up at all their houses and beat the shit out of them.
Jay : [ singing ] I can't believe I'm gonna get some pussy for stealin' the monkey. Jay : Stealin' the little monkey. Man, if I woulda known that, I would have been stealin' monkeys since I was like, seven and shit. Chaka : I film this shit, I yell cut and then I get the fuck outta here back to my trailer, because I got more white girls in there than the first lifeboat of the Titanic, and they all want a part in my movie, and I got just the part for 'em!
Jay : If today is Tuesday and the movie starts filming on Friday, we have Holden : Uh, three by my count, but close. Jay : Right. My bad. Three days to stop that fucking movie from getting made. Come on, Silent Bob. We're going to Hollywood! Jay : And I can't believe fine-ass bitches like yourselves eat that shit. Don't you know fast food makes girls fart? Brent : [ getting into the van ] Say, what's all this talk about farting?
Whillenholly : I think I would recognize an ape if I saw one and the only thing I see right now is a political fiasco that I'm about to avoid by letting this buttfuckin' Brady Bunch go! Whillenholly : Well it isn't my way but I'll be damned if their doesn't go one happy family. Okay men let's shoot some tear gas into the diner and when they come out we'll Fuck beans!
That was them wasn't it? Jay : What the fuck are you talking about? Brent : Hey! Watch the language, little boy! Jay : What? I've got a wiping problem. I just stick those little pieces up my brown-eye and bam! I get no stains in my undies. What you don't believe me? Check this shit out. Spread my cheeks, so he can see the fucking stink nuggets!
Chaka : Another white boy in this movie? Brodie : And on that note, we cue the music. Brent : Hey Mr. Science Guy I don't really wanna die. I'm a noble rabbit Whillenholly : Who let the cats out? I must be the craftiest motherfucker alive.
Jay : You know, maybe one night me and Lunch Box are out we're mackin' some chick and shit, and she's, like, "Ooh, I want to suck youse guys' dicks off," and she's, like, "What your names? And she's like, "Oh, I've read on the Internet that fuckin' youse guys are a couple of little fuckin' jerkoffs.
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